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A B S T R A C T
The reward positivity is a component of the event-related brain potential (ERP) sensitive to neural mechanisms
of reward processing. Multiple studies have demonstrated that reward positivity amplitude indices a reward
prediction error signal that is fundamental to theories of reinforcement learning. However, whether this ERP
component is also sensitive to richer forms of performance information important for supervised learning is less
clear. To investigate this question, we recorded the electroencephalogram from participants engaged in a time
estimation task in which the type of error information conveyed by feedback stimuli was systematically varied
across conditions. Consistent with our predictions, we found that reward positivity amplitude decreased in re-
lation to increasing information content of the feedback, and that reward positivity amplitude was unrelated to
trial-to-trial behavioral adjustments in task performance. By contrast, a series of exploratory analyses revealed
frontal-central and posterior ERP components immediately following the reward positivity that related to these
processes. Taken in the context of the wider literature, these results suggest that the reward positivity is pro-
duced by a neural mechanism that motivates task performance, whereas the later ERP components apply the
feedback information according to principles of supervised learning.
1. Introduction
The ability of humans to approach good things and avoid bad things
derives from the fundamental ability to distinguish between the two in
the ﬁrst place. Over the past two decades, a component of the human
event-related brain potential (ERP) has provided evidence for the
neural mechanism that underpins this process. Originally called the
“feedback error-related negativity” because of the presence of a nega-
tive-going deﬂection in the ERP about 250 ms following error feedback
(Miltner et al., 1997), it has recently been re-termed the “reward po-
sitivity” in recognition that the diﬀerence in the ERPs to positive and
negative feedback results more from reward processing than from error
processing (Proudﬁt, 2015; Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016). The logic
underlying this inference stems from an analysis approach that removes
confounding ERP components by subtracting one ERP from another
(Luck, 2014). On this view, task-related stimuli in general – whether
error-related or not – elicit a negative-going ERP deﬂection called the
N2 (Holroyd, 2004). However, an exception occurs to reward feedback,
which does not elicit the N2 – indicating that the diﬀerence in the ERPs
to positive and negative feedback is speciﬁcally due to reward proces-
sing (Holroyd et al., 2008b; see also Baker and Holroyd, 2011; Foti
et al., 2011b; Holroyd et al., 2011; Warren and Holroyd, 2012).
Much has been learned about the reward positivity in the 20 years
since its discovery (for reviews see Sambrook and Goslin, 2015; Walsh
and Anderson, 2012). In particular, we proposed that the ERP compo-
nent reﬂects a speciﬁc type of reward signal called a reward prediction
error (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Reward prediction error signals are
modulated by feedback expectancy but have opposite signs for un-
expected positive events relative to unexpected negative events (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). By contrast, “surprise” or “salience” signals are larger
to unexpected events relative to expected events, but have the same
sign irrespective of the valence of the outcomes. Although controversial
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2011; Ferdinand et al., 2012; Hajcak et al., 2005;
Holroyd et al., 2012; Oliveira et al., 2007; Sallet et al., 2013; Talmi
et al., 2013; Ullsperger et al., 2014), numerous studies have indicated
that the reward positivity behaves as a reward prediction error signal
(e.g., Heydari and Holroyd, 2016; Holroyd and Krigolson, 2007;
Holroyd et al., 2003; Holroyd et al., 2009; Martin et al., 2009), as
conﬁrmed by a meta-analysis of over 55 data sets (Sambrook and
Goslin, 2015). It is less clear whether the ERP component is sensitive to
reward magnitude (Hajcak et al., 2006; Holroyd et al., 2006), but the
meta-analysis also suggests this to be the case (Sambrook and Goslin,
2015). The reward positivity is also sensitive to the dimension of
feedback valence that is most salient (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004) and to
the context in which the rewards are delivered (e.g., Holroyd et al.,
2004), and is generally larger following responses (Hajcak et al., 2007)
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and in tasks with controllable outcomes (e.g., Holroyd et al., 2009; Li
et al., 2011; Sambrook and Goslin, 2015; Warren and Holroyd, 2012;
Yeung et al., 2005).
Reward prediction error signals provide a computationally powerful
means for the adaptive modiﬁcation of behavior according to principles
of reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998). A recent study
provides a striking demonstration that the reward positivity functions
as such a reinforcer: In the absence of overt human behavior, a brain-
computer interface utilized the reward positivity to train an artiﬁcial
agent to perform a task (Zander et al., 2016). For this reason, it is
somewhat puzzling that variation in reward positivity amplitude has
been inconsistently associated with behavioral adaptation across stu-
dies (for reviews see Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016; Walsh and
Anderson, 2012). For example, in one notable study, task instructions
immediately modiﬁed participants' behavior but not reward positivity
amplitude, illustrating a dissociation between the two (Walsh and
Anderson, 2011). Likewise, the reward positivity can be elicited even in
the absence of overt behavior that immediately precedes the feedback
(e.g., Yeung et al., 2005) and is sensitive to task contexts that predict
reward (Umemoto et al., 2017).
One possibility for this seeming discrepancy is that the reinforcing
signal modulates a higher-level decision making mechanism that is
relatively unconcerned about low-level regulation of the action pro-
duction system (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). In fact, a growing literature
suggests that the reward positivity is associated with motivational
factors related to task performance (Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016). In
particular, the reward positivity is sensitive to individual diﬀerences in
personality (e.g., Cherniawsky and Holroyd, 2013; Umemoto and
Holroyd, 2017; Schmidt et al., in press), emotions (Foti et al., 2011a;
Hewig et al., 2011), and psychiatric disorders (e.g., Baker et al., 2011;
Hewig et al., 2010; Holroyd et al., 2008a; Umemoto et al., 2014) related
to motivational factors associated with reward processing and task
engagement (for reviews see Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016; Proudﬁt,
2015). These considerations dovetail with the proposal that anterior
cingulate cortex, where the reward positivity is believed to be gener-
ated (Becker et al., 2014; Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016; Walsh and
Anderson, 2012), is concerned with motivational control over extended
behaviors (Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Holroyd and McClure, 2015).
Although a great deal has been learned over the past decades about
the response of the reward positivity to diﬀerent types of feedback,
surprisingly little is known about how it responds to the degree of in-
formation conveyed by the feedback. At the most granular level, feed-
back can either convey information or not; neutral stimuli that indicate
neither whether a response was correct or incorrect elicit an N2 that is
as large as (Holroyd et al., 2006) or larger than (Li et al., 2016) the
negativity to error feedback, variation that appears to be due to in-
dividual diﬀerences in neuroticism (Hirsh and Inzlicht, 2008) and an-
xiety (Gu et al., 2010). At a ﬁner scale, feedback information can
convey not only whether a response was correct or incorrect, but also
the degree of accuracy. For example, a study that compared near misses
with full misses in a gambling task found that reward positivity am-
plitude was larger to the former than to the latter (Ulrich and Hewig,
2014), though this study measured the component base-to-peak rather
than as a diﬀerence wave, complicating the interpretation. Reward
positivity amplitude also scaled with feedback accuracy in a dart-
throwing paradigm (Frömer et al., 2016), and with the degree of de-
viation from a target in the brain-computer interface experiment de-
scribed above (Zander et al., 2016).
Notably, in an adaptation of the classic time-estimation task ﬁrst
used to demonstrate the existence of the reward positivity (Miltner
et al., 1997), Mars et al. (2004) found that the reward positivity am-
plitude was larger to binary performance feedback compared to feed-
back indicating that subjects were either too fast or too slow, and to
feedback indicating the degree of error. They also found that reward
positivity amplitude was unrelated to post-feedback behavioral ad-
justments. On the other hand, another time estimation task study found
diametrically opposite results: reward positivity amplitude increased
with increasing information content of the outcomes, and was related to
post-feedback adjustments (Grundler et al., 2010). And still another
time estimation task study that used graded feedback – that indicated
by exactly how much the errors were either too fast or too slow – found
larger reward positivity amplitudes for larger errors, and that the size of
the component was unrelated to learning outcomes (Luft et al., 2014).
These observations indicate that the interrelationship between reward
positivity amplitude, the amount of information provided by feedback,
and behavioral adaptation remains opaque.
To investigate this issue, we examined the reward positivity in a
modiﬁed time estimation task in which on each trial subjects received,
depending on condition, 1) binary feedback indicating that subjects were
on time or not, 2) directional feedback indicating that they responded
either too slowly, too quickly, or were on time, 3) magnitude feedback
indicating that they were either on time, or by how much they were not
on time, and 4) full feedback that provided information about both the
direction and magnitude of the errors. We predicted that subjects' re-
medial behaviors would mirror the quality of the feedback, that reward
positivity amplitude would be inversely related to the degree of in-
formation content conveyed by the feedback, and that reward positivity
amplitude would be unrelated to behavior. Finally, in a series of ex-
ploratory analyses, we also examined the eﬀects of the feedback in-
formation on later ERP components elicited by the feedback.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
25 right-handed undergraduate students from the University of
Victoria participated in the experiment. One participant was excluded
due to language barriers and a failure to understand the instructions.
All of the participants were volunteers who received extra credit in a
ﬁrst- or second-year psychology course for their participation and
provided written, informed consent. The study was conducted in ac-
cordance with the ethical standards prescribed in the Declaration of
Helsinki and was approved by the human subjects review board at the
University of Victoria.
2.2. Apparatus and procedure
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor in an
electromagnetically shielded booth to perform the time estimation task
(written in Matlab 7.1 using the psychophysics toolbox extension,
Brainard and Vision, 1997). The task was similar to that employed by
Miltner et al. (1997) in which participants were asked to estimate a
duration of 1 s (Fig. 1). Each trial began with a centrally positioned
ﬁxation cross (duration 500 ms) followed by an auditory cue (1500 Hz,
65 dB, duration 50 ms). Participants were asked to respond by pressing
the spacebar once they believed 1 s had elapsed since the time of the
tone. Feedback was displayed (duration 1000 ms) 500 ms following
their response. An estimate was considered to be ‘correct’ if it was
within a dynamic temporal window centered at 1000 ms after the tone,
and was considered ‘incorrect’ otherwise.
The temporal window of accuracy was initialized at 1000 ms ±
200 ms. Thus, each participant was required to respond between
800 ms and 1200 ms following the auditory cue to receive correct
feedback on the ﬁrst trial of each condition. The accuracy window was
adjusted after each trial using a staircase procedure to ensure that
participants received approximately equal proportions of correct and
incorrect feedback in all conditions. The width of the window was in-
creased or decreased by 10 ms following correct or incorrect responses
respectively.
A centrally presented yellow-ﬁlled square served as correct feed-
back in all conditions. Incorrect feedback stimuli varied according to
experimental condition (Fig. 1). In the binary condition, participants
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were shown a centrally positioned blue-ﬁlled square following an in-
correct response. In the direction condition, participants were shown a
centrally positioned square with either the upper or lower half ﬁlled
blue, indicating that they either over- or under-estimated the temporal
interval, respectively. In the magnitude condition, participants were
shown a centrally positioned blue-ﬁlled rectangle with height propor-
tional to the degree of the error. Finally, in the full condition, partici-
pants were shown a square with a blue-ﬁlled rectangle in either the
upper or lower portion (indicating direction of error) and with height
proportional to the magnitude of the estimate error. Of note, error
stimulus complexity was unique to each condition, leaving the possi-
bility that conditional eﬀects could be driven by low-level stimulus
features as opposed to the informational content of that stimulus.
However, we favor this design over alternatives in which error stimuli
are identical across all conditions (with participants asked to ignore
irrelevant stimulus features) due to the possibility that participants
could either forget which features were relevant or superstitiously
identify patterns in the irrelevant features. The mappings between
feedback color (yellow/blue) and valence (correct/incorrect) were
counterbalanced across participants, as was condition ordering.
Participants began each condition block with a computer‑led de-
monstration outlining the meaning of the feedback stimuli, followed by
a series of probe questions to ensure that they understood the in-
formation content of the feedback stimuli (e.g. ‘If you see this blue
square, was your estimate a) correct or b) incorrect?’, ‘If you see a
square with the upper portion ﬁlled blue, was your estimate a) correct,
b) an overestimate, or c) an underestimate?’, and so on). Participants
then performed 15 practice trials before being asked a set of probe
questions once more. After successfully demonstrating an under-
standing of the feedback stimuli, they performed 200 trials in the test
block. Participants were exposed to 800 test trials across all four
feedback conditions.
2.3. Data acquisition and pre-processing
Responses were captured using a standard keyboard, while response
time (in ms) and accuracy (within the temporal window or not) were
recorded on each trial. The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded
from 42 electrode locations using BrainVision Recorder software
(Version 1.3, Brainproducts, GmbH, Munich, Germany). The electrodes
were mounted in a ﬁtted cap with a standard 10–20 layout and were
referenced to the average voltage across channels. The vertical and
horizontal electrooculograms were recorded from electrodes placed
above and below the right eye and on the outer canthi of the left and
right eyes, respectively. Electrode impedances were kept below 10 kΩ.
The EEG data were sampled at 250 Hz, ampliﬁed (Quick Amp, Brain
Products, GmbH, Munich, Germany), and ﬁltered through a passband of
0.017 Hz–67.5 Hz (90 dB octave roll oﬀ).
EEG data were preprocessed using a semi-automated preprocessing
pipeline and EEGLab. The ﬁrst pre-processing step identiﬁed ocular
artifacts in the data. The raw EEG data were re-referenced to linked
mastoids, high-pass ﬁltered oﬄine at 1 Hz to remove slow-drift fre-
quencies, and segmented from −1500 ms before to 1500 ms after re-
sponse. Segments were manually inspected for artifacts, which were
removed, before submitting the data to an independent components
analysis. Component decompositions were inspected to identify ste-
reotyped ocular artifacts according to spatial and spectral character-
istics (front-central, and high power at low-frequency).
The second pre-processing step removed artifacts from the data and
shaped it for analysis. The raw data were re-referenced to linked mas-
toids, then the unmixing ICA matrix computed in the ﬁrst pre-proces-
sing step was applied to the EEG data. Components capturing eye blinks
and saccades were removed, then a high- and low- pass ﬁlter was ap-
plied at 0.1 Hz and 20 Hz, respectively. The continuous data were
segmented at−200 ms to 800 ms peri-feedback, and baseline corrected
from −200-0 ms preceding feedback presentation. Finally, an artifact
screening process excluded all epochs with minimum/maximum am-
plitudes beyond +−75 μV.
2.4. Data analysis
Mean response times, adjustments (shift in response time between
trials), and accuracies, were calculated for each participant and con-
dition. Trials with response times> 3 standard deviations from the
mean were removed, and response time data were log-transformed to
produce a normally distributed data sample.
The grand average diﬀerence wave was used to identify components
of interest (Luck, 2014). This method removes activity related purely to
event probability, while retaining activity related to event valence and/
or to the interaction of event valence with event probability (Holroyd
and Krigolson, 2007; Sambrook and Goslin, 2015). The diﬀerence wave
was computed for each subject using the average ERP waveforms fol-
lowing correct and incorrect feedback for each channel across all con-
ditions. The grand-average diﬀerence wave was computed as the
average diﬀerence across all subjects. The inﬂuence of task variables on
components of interest was analyzed using normalized (z-scored within
subject and channel) single trial EEG voltage averaged within a speci-
ﬁed window at a speciﬁc channel of interest. All statistical analyses
were speciﬁed as mixed-eﬀects models using the lme4 package in R,
and all model comparison was performed by varying the ﬁxed eﬀects
terms while holding the random eﬀects constant. Detailed model spe-
ciﬁcations can be found in the Supplementary materials.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results
Participants exhibited a slight bias toward making more correct
responses in each condition (accuracy mean/std = 0.52/0.5, all t(23)-
Fig. 1. Task dynamics and design. Top: Each trial was initiated with a ﬁxation cross
(duration 500 ms), followed by an auditory tone. Participants made a response (button
press) once they estimated 1 s had elapsed since tone onset. Feedback was displayed
500 ms following response onset (duration 1000 ms). Correct feedback, a uniformly color-
ﬁlled square, was presented if participants responded within a dynamically sized window
centered at 1 s; incorrect feedback was presented otherwise. Bottom: incorrect feedback
varied in terms of the amount of corrective information given: binary (correct/incorrect);
direction (too fast/slow); magnitude (absolute deviation from 1 s); full (too fast/slow
+ absolute deviation from 1 s).
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values > 4.5, all p-values < 0.01), but accuracy was equivalent
across conditions (X(3, 24) = 1.0, p = 0.8, see Supplementary Eq. (1))
as was the mean temporal window of accuracy (X(3, 24) = 4.8,
p = 0.18, see Supplementary Eq. (2)). In order to assess whether or not
participants used the corrective information encoded in the error
feedback stimulus, we probed the relationship between the error
feedback they received and the adjustment made on the subsequent
trial. Response adjustments across conditions show that participants did
indeed use directional feedback information when it was provided.
Model comparison revealed that directional adjustment accuracy dif-
fered across feedback conditions (X(1,24) = 7.9, p < 0.01, see
Supplementary Eq. (3)). Relative to the binary condition, subsequent
post-hoc tests showed that adjustments were more likely to be in the
correct direction in both directional feedback conditions (direction and
full Beta-weights > 0.35, p-values < 0.01, see Supplementary Eq.
(4)), demonstrating that participants used this information when it was
provided. This advantage was not observed in the magnitude condition
(Beta-weight = 0.07, p = 0.28). Participants also leveraged corrective
magnitude information. Model comparison shows that adjustments
matched response time error magnitudes diﬀerently across feedback
conditions (X(1,24) = 3.67, p = 0.05, see Supplementary Eq. (5)).
Post-hoc tests show that relative to the binary feedback condition,
participants made signiﬁcantly smaller adjustment errors in all other
conditions following incorrect feedback (all Beta-weights < −0.1, all
p-values < 0.05, see Supplementary Eq. (6)). These results suggest
that although magnitude information was clearly used to shape re-
sponse adjustments, participants also leveraged directional information
to improve the magnitude of their adjustments. This is consistent with
the use of internal task model which would allow adjustment decisions
to beneﬁt from the reduced space of potential options when directional
information was provided; however, we do not currently have direct
evidence to support this hypothesis.
3.2. EEG results
With our primary focus being the reward positivity, we ﬁrst ex-
amined the latency and scalp distribution of the grand-average diﬀer-
ence wave in order to identify components of interest for further ana-
lysis. The peak amplitude of the diﬀerence wave between
200 ms–400 ms occurred at 256 ms following feedback onset (Fig. 2A
region-i), and was maximal at channel FCz (Fig. 2B region-i), consistent
with previous characterizations of the reward positivity (Holroyd and
Krigolson, 2007; Miltner et al., 1997). Diﬀerence wave amplitude at
FCz (−6.1 μV) was signiﬁcantly larger than the amplitude at a pos-
terior control channel (Pz: −4.3 μV, t(23) =−4.06, p < 0.01). An
analysis of both central (Fpz, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz, Oz) and lateral
(FT9, FC5, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC6, FT10) electrodes showed that the dif-
ference wave was signiﬁcantly curved across both orientations (central
channel curvature polynomial test t-scores: order 1 = 4.1, 2 = 15.8,
3 =−5.5; lateral curvature polynomial test t-scores: order 1 =−4.7,
2 = 20.35, 3 = 1.4, see Supplementary Eq. (7)). The conditional dif-
ference waveforms were all found to be maximal at channel FCz
(Fig. 3A). Thus, the latency (256 ms) and scalp distribution (front-
central) of the diﬀerence wave was consistent with its identiﬁcation as
the reward positivity (Miltner et al., 1997).
Having established the spatial and temporal location of the reward
positivity, we probed the eﬀect of corrective information embedded in
the feedback stimulus. Given the inﬂuence corrective error feedback
had on subsequent adjustments, we also aimed to determine whether
the reward positivity was predictive of behavioral adjustments. To do
so, we included feedback valence (correct/incorrect), error feedback
condition (binary, direction, magnitude, full), and subsequent adjustment
as predictors of normalized EEG voltage at channel FCz averaged across
a time-averaged window of 256 ms ± 10 ms (see Supplementary Eq.
(8)). Model comparison revealed a signiﬁcantly positive deﬂection
following positive feedback (main eﬀect of valence: Beta = 0.63, X
(1,24) = 14.8, p < 0.01), while neither of the remaining main eﬀect
terms were signiﬁcant. In line with our hypothesized inﬂuence of cor-
rective information on the reward positivity, we found a signiﬁcantly
decreasing voltage diﬀerence between correct/incorrect trials (va-
lence× condition interaction: Beta =−0.07, X(1,24) = 31.96,
p < 0.01), while neither of the remaining interaction terms were sig-
niﬁcant. We probed the character of the accuracy× condition interac-
tion further using a polynomial test1 (see Supplementary Eq. (9),
Fig. 3A). This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant linear decrease in the
voltage diﬀerence between correct and incorrect feedback
(Beta =−10.5, X(2,24) = 31.2, p < 0.01), suggesting that both di-
rection and magnitude contributed to modulate the reward positivity.
Neither quadratic (X(2,24) = 1.1, p = 0.6) nor cubic (X(2,24) = 1.7,
p = 0.43) terms were found to oﬀer a signiﬁcant improvement over the
linear predictor as would be expected if either direction or magnitude
information (but not both) was solely responsible for modulating the
reward positivity. Thus, as hypothesized, the reward positivity was
found to decrease as corrective feedback information increased. Fur-
thermore, subsequent behavioral adjustments were not found to be
encoded in the reward positivity, consistent with previous report failing
to link this component with behavioral adaptation (Holroyd and
Umemoto, 2016).
Corrective information embedded within the feedback stimuli was
confounded with variability of the stimulus itself; thus, stimulus
variability could potentially inﬂuence EEG eﬀects due to imbalanced
low-level stimulus features across conditions, or via latency jitter in-
duced by increasingly variable processing times. As such, we aimed to
determine if the observed modulation of the reward positivity was
perhaps due to features of the stimulus itself. As a ﬁrst control test we
Fig. 2. Grand average waveforms and scalp maps: A) grand average waveforms (all
subjects all conditions) at channel FCz following correct feedback, incorrect feedback, and
the incorrect-correct diﬀerence wave. B) Grand average diﬀerence wave scalp maps from
the regions framed within i) the region of analysis for the reward positivity; ii) the frontal-
central positivity centered at 384 ms post feedback presentation; and iii) the region
analyzed as the posterior late-wave component.
1 We also compared this linear model to a 2 × 2 (Direction × Magnitude) factor
model; however, model comparison favored the linear model (BIC = 48,523) over the
2 × 2 model (BIC = 48,569).
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assess component modulation following large errors (> 300 ms) in ei-
ther the binary or magnitude conditions, where error stimuli were
identical due to saturation of the magnitude feedback stimulus (see
Supplementary Eq. (11)). Counter to the null eﬀect predicted by the
stimulus variability account, and in line with our previously reported
results, we found a signiﬁcantly smaller diﬀerence between correct/
incorrect trials in the magnitude condition (valence× condition inter-
action: Beta =−0.25, X(1,24) = 12.3, p < 0.01). As a secondary
control we probed voltage modulation following correct feedback,
where stimuli were identical across all four conditions (see
Supplementary Eq. (4)). Once again, counter to the null eﬀect predicted
by modulation driven by stimulus variability (or lack thereof), we found
that voltage decreased linearly as a function of condition (main eﬀect of
condition: Beta =−3.14, X(1,24) = 7.04, p = 0.01). Thus, assuming
that ‘correct’ feedback processing times were equatable across condi-
tions, variation in the reward positivity does not appear to be driven by
either low-level stimulus features or variable stimulus processing times,
suggesting that the reward positivity is indeed modulated by corrective
feedback information.
We now turn to exploratory analyses prompted by inspection of the
grand-average diﬀerence waveform. An apparent large positive-going
deﬂection following the reward positivity can be seen to peak at 384 ms
(Fig. 2A, region-ii). Although this positivity occurred in the time range
of the P3, the diﬀerence wave was maximal at channel FCz (Fig. 2B
region-ii), unlike the P3, which is maximal at channel Pz (Donchin and
Coles, 1988). Inspection of this component's variance showed that, in
contrast to the reward positivity, this delayed positivity was insensitive
to the information content of the feedback stimulus, but was predictive
of the subsequent adjustment. A repetition of the analysis investigating
valence, condition, and adjustment as predictors of mean EEG voltage
(see Supplementary Eq. (8)) at channel FCz within a time window of
384 ms ± 10 ms revealed a signiﬁcant accuracy× adjustment interac-
tion (Beta = 0.05, X(1,24) = 11.7, p < 0.01). No other interaction
eﬀects were found to be signiﬁcant. Inspection of the ERPs revealed a
negative modulation predictive of better adjustments following correct
feedback, and a positive modulation predictive of better adjustment
following incorrect feedback (Fig. 3B).
Finally, the diﬀerence wave also suggested sustained modulation of
activity later in the trial according to feedback information. To in-
vestigate this later component, we computed the mean voltage across a
time window of 500–700 ms post-stimulus (Fig. 2A region-iii), which
was maximal at posterior channel Pz (Fig. 2B region-iii). Unlike the
reward positivity, which sharply distinguished between correct and
incorrect outcomes, the slow posterior activity appeared to scale with
the amount of information encoded in the feedback stimulus (Fig. 3A
and C). To investigate this further we compared a model that included
valence and condition as predictors of EEG voltage (see Supplementary
Eq. (11)) with a model that predicted EEG voltage according to an or-
dering of the number of bits required to encode the variance of the
stimulus (i.e., the informational content of the stimulus, see Supple-
mentary Eq. (12)). Given that these models are not nested, we used BIC
scores as a ﬁtness test, revealing that the posterior late-wave compo-
nents was better explained by the bits model (BIC = 46,956) than the
accuracy× condition model (BIC = 46,995), suggesting that this com-
ponent is better described as indexing the amount of information en-
coded by the feedback stimulus.
4. Discussion
Although much has been learned over the past decades about factors
that modulate reward positivity amplitude, little is known about whe-
ther the reward positivity is impacted by the amount of corrective in-
formation provided by feedback stimuli. To investigate this issue,
subjects performed a time estimation task in which the feedback con-
tent varied by condition. We observed reduced reward positivity am-
plitude as a function of the amount of feedback information: the reward
positivity was largest for binary feedback that indicated only whether
subjects responses were on time or not, smallest when the error feed-
back indicated how much and in which direction (faster or slower)
error responses were oﬀ-time, and somewhere in between for inter-
mediate levels of feedback that provided only the direction or magni-
tude of the error. We also found that reward positivity amplitude was
uncorrelated with task performance across subjects, irrespective of
condition, and did not predict trial-to-trial changes in task performance
for any condition.
Our ﬁndings largely support the results of a previous reward posi-
tivity study that also varied the level of feedback information in a time
Fig. 3. Feedback-elicited event-related brain potentials (ERPs) and diﬀerence waves. A)
Incorrect-correct diﬀerence waves recorded at channel FCz for all 4 feedback information
conditions. B) ERPs recorded at channel FCz following correct and incorrect feedback
averaged separately for small and large adjustments on the following trial. C) ERPs re-
corded at channel Pz following correct and incorrect feedback across all 4 feedback
conditions.
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estimation task (Mars et al., 2004). Although that study did not include
an equivalent of our magnitude condition, and provided false feedback
in their full condition (error magnitudes were provided irrespective of
how far oﬀ the subjects actually were) the authors also observed a
smaller reward positivity for the conditions with graded feedback
compared to binary feedback, and failed to ﬁnd any relationship be-
tween the size of this component and behavioral adjustments. Cur-
iously, a diﬀerent laboratory has reported diametrically opposite results
using a similar time estimation task (larger reward positivities to in-
creased feedback information, together with evidence of behavioral
adaptation), but the brevity of the report makes this discrepancy dif-
ﬁcult to evaluate (Grundler et al., 2010). Another time estimation task
study that used graded feedback found larger reward positivity ampli-
tudes for larger errors, which were also unrelated to learning outcomes,
but this study did not compare the reward positivities across diﬀerent
conditions (e.g., binary vs. graded, Luft et al., 2014).
We see four possibilities that could explain why reward positivity
amplitude was inversely related to feedback information content. First,
diﬀerences in ERP component amplitudes across conditions could arise
indirectly from latency variability or from component overlap due to
variation in stimulus complexity and/or feedback salience (Baker and
Holroyd, 2011; Krigolson et al., 2012; Pfabigan et al., 2015). However,
an analysis of reward positivity amplitude to large error feedback vs.
correct feedback in the magnitude condition and error vs. correct
feedback in the binary condition – where the error feedback stimuli
across the two conditions were roughly equivalent (i.e., fully colored
squares) – revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of condition. Furthermore, an
analysis of correct feedback stimuli, which were identical across all four
conditions, revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of condition: The inﬂuence of
correct feedback exhibited a linearly decreasing eﬀect on EEG voltage
at channel FCz during the reward positivity time period. Finally, reward
positivity latency was consistent across the conditions. These observa-
tions argue against the possibility that the conditional diﬀerences in
reward positivity amplitude stemmed from low-level properties of the
feedback stimuli.
Second, richer feedback information could have fostered the de-
velopment of a more accurate internal model of the estimated interval,
enabling people to rely less on the feedback itself. Following the reward
prediction error theory, this hypothesis would predict a larger reward
positivity produced at the time of the response on these trials (Holroyd
and Coles, 2002). Although previous studies have examined ERPs eli-
cited by erroneously timed responses (e.g., Johnson et al., 1997; Luu
et al., 2000; Stahl, 2010), this hypothesis is diﬃcult to verify given the
confound of component overlap for response-locked ERPs that vary
greatly in response times (Coles et al., 2001).
Third, given our argument that reward positivity amplitude reﬂects
overall motivational levels to perform the task – as opposed to a process
that adaptively modulates behavior from trial-to-trial (Holroyd and
Umemoto, 2016) – the smaller reward positivity to more complex
feedback could have reﬂected decreased motivation in that condition.
We have previously observed that feedback can elicit a reward posi-
tivity even when no response is involved (Yeung et al., 2005); in that
study, reward positivity amplitude was associated with self-reports of
interest in the task but not with other factors such as the degree of
attention paid by participants (Yeung et al., 2005). In the present ex-
periment we also found that reward positivity amplitude was unrelated
to trial-to-trial changes in task performance. Although several previous
studies have in fact pointed to an association between reward positivity
amplitude and behavioral adaptation (e.g., Arbel et al., 2013; Castellar
et al., 2010; Cohen and Ranganath, 2007; Frank et al., 2005; Hewig
et al., 2011; Holroyd and Krigolson, 2007; Philiastides et al., 2010;
Santesso et al., 2008; van der Helden et al., 2010; Yasuda et al., 2004),
an equal number of studies have failed to do so (e.g., Chase et al., 2011;
Krigolson et al., 2009; Luft et al., 2013, 2014; Miltner et al., 1997; Sailer
et al., 2010; van de Vijver et al., 2011; Walsh and Anderson, 2011). For
example, when participants were given task instructions that
immediately impacted their behavior, reward positivity amplitude
evolved with learning according to a slowly-changing reward predic-
tion error signal (Walsh and Anderson, 2011). Similarly, in a task de-
signed to disentangle reward prediction error signals from behavioral
use of those signals, reward positivity amplitude was associated with
the former but not the latter (Chase et al., 2011). And we have also
recently found that feedback that is known by participants to be un-
reliable, and thus ineﬀective for behavioral modiﬁcation, nevertheless
elicits a normal-sized reward positivity (Li et al., 2017).
Fourth, the complex feedback in this study could have disengaged
the reinforcement learning system in favor of a diﬀerent learning
system. Broadly speaking, learning algorithms in computational neu-
roscience fall into 3 categories: unsupervised learning, reinforcement
learning, and supervised learning (Dayan and Abbott, 2001; O'Reilly
and Munakata, 2000). Unsupervised learning relies on Hebb's rule
(“neurons that ﬁre together wire together”) to identify patterns of
correlations in the data without reference to externally-deﬁned targets
or goals – essentially performing a form of principal components ana-
lysis (O'Reilly and Munakata, 2000). Thus for example, Hebbian
learning principles have been used to simulate the formation of feature
maps that encode stimulus orientation in striate cortex (Obermayer
et al., 1990).
By contrast, reinforcement learning depends on a reward term that
modulates the strength of Hebb's rule, increasing connection weights
only following actions that yield a desired outcome. Crucially, these
reward signals indicate only “how good” or “how bad” an outcome is –
much like the children's game where one child searches for a hidden
object while a second conveys feedback in terms of levels of tempera-
ture: “You're getting warmer!” and “You're getting colder!” (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). Midbrain dopamine neurons are widely believed to
convey an advanced reinforcement learning signal that indicates not
simply whether an outcome is good or bad, but whether it is better or
worse than expected (Niv, 2009; Schultz, 2016). By modulating the
activity of anterior cingulate cortex, these dopamine signals are hy-
pothesized to produce the reward prediction error signals observed in
the reward positivity (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Sambrook and Goslin,
2015).
Lastly, supervised learning depends on richer sources of error
feedback that indicate not whether a response was correct or incorrect,
but what the response actually should have been. Thus under su-
pervised learning the “You're Getting Warmer” game would be much
less engaging: Every wrong move would be met with feedback in-
dicating the object's actual location. The best-known supervised
learning algorithm is probably backpropagation (Rumelhart et al.,
1986), which provides the basis for modern “deep learning” algorithms
that are currently revolutionizing artiﬁcial intelligence (Schmidhuber,
2015). Although backpropagation is famously regarded as being bio-
logically implausible (Crick, 1989), various neural systems such as the
cerebellum (Popa et al., 2016) and posterior parietal cortex (Shadmehr
and Wise, 2005) clearly utilize complex sources of error feedback, and
the search for biologically-plausible forms of supervised learning con-
tinues (e.g., Marblestone et al., 2016).
Given these observations, we speculate that increasing the amount
of information conveyed by the feedback stimuli shifted the computa-
tional burden from the system that produces the reward positivity to
other neural systems. On this view, the feedback stimuli in the full
condition, which indicated both whether subjects responded too
quickly or too slowly and by how much, exceeded the computational
capacity of the dopamine system, which is not thought to encode error
information along multiple dimensions. Instead, that process may have
been given over to other neural systems that are known to utilize
complex error signals for motor adaptation, such as the cerebellum
(Popa et al., 2016). Although speculative, this possibility could be
tested with functional magnetic resonance imaging.
In contrast to the reward positivity itself, we found ERP correlates of
behavioral adaptation occurring after the reward positivity. In
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particular, we observed an interaction in ERP amplitude at about
380 ms post-feedback between feedback valence and how well subjects
corrected their behavior on the following trial. Further, unlike the re-
ward positivity, there was no eﬀect of information content on this
signal. These considerations suggest that information related to beha-
vioral adaptation is evaluated only at this stage, immediately sub-
sequent to the reward positivity, irrespective of how much information
the feedback actually provides. In fact, numerous studies over the years
have examined P3 amplitude as it relates to feedback processing (see
San Martin, 2012 for a review), and some studies have found a re-
lationship between feedback-elicited P3 amplitude and trial-to-trial
changes in behavior (e.g., Chase et al., 2011). Yet, the P3 is distributed
over posterior areas of the scalp (Donchin and Coles, 1988), which is
inconsistent with the eﬀect that we observed, which peaked over
frontal-central areas of the scalp.
To our knowledge, only one study has previously identiﬁed frontal-
central activity during this time range that distinguished between
feedback valence and that was associated with learning outcomes
(Arbel et al., 2013). That study examined the eﬀect of feedback on long-
term learning in a paired-associate learning paradigm. Principal com-
ponents analysis applied to the ERP data indicated that positive feed-
back elicited more negative-going activity than did error feedback, and
that the degree of the negative deviation was larger for stimuli that
were better remembered. By contrast, we found that a positive mod-
ulation predicted better adjustment following incorrect feedback, and
that a negative modulation predicted better adjustments following
correct feedback. Thus, these studies diﬀered on whether a positive
deﬂection following error feedback was followed by better or worse
performance, a discrepancy that merits further investigation in future
studies.
Finally, we also found that posterior activity at about 500–700 ms
post-feedback was linearly related to the information content of the
feedback, but was not related to its valence nor to behavioral adjust-
ments. In particular, the late ERP became more positive with increasing
information content in the feedback. Several early ERP studies have
identiﬁed a so called slow wave component with a frontal-negative and
posterior-positive topography (e.g., Loveless et al., 1987). For example,
a slow wave is elicited to oddball and novel stimuli (Spencer et al.,
2001). Yet despite long-standing interest in this ERP component, little is
known about its functional signiﬁcance. Suggestively, emotionally
arousing pictures, faces, and words evoke a similar, slow-going positive
deﬂection over posterior scalp areas (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Keil et al.,
2002; see Hajcak et al., 2012 for review), but the process that this
shares in common with feedback evaluation is not obvious. In fact, this
late positivity appears to be composed of diﬀerent components asso-
ciated with diﬀerent cognitive processes (Foti et al., 2009). For ex-
ample, in free recall paradigms, the signal is more positive-going to
emotional pictures that are subsequently remembered than for emo-
tional stimuli that are subsequently forgotten, suggesting that the pro-
cess could relate to stimulus encoding (Dolcos and Cabeza, 2002).
Consistent with this, this slow posterior activity also relates to perfor-
mance in learning (Sailer et al., 2010) and memory (Azizian and Polich,
2007) tasks. These considerations suggest that the signal could reﬂect
reconﬁguration of the posterior system in line with the feedback in-
formation content.
To summarize, we found smaller reward positivity amplitudes for
feedback stimuli that provided richer behaviorally-relevant informa-
tion. However, reward positivity amplitude did not predict trial-to-trial
behavioral adaptations. By contrast, frontal-central ERP activity that
occurred immediately after the reward positivity did predict trial-to-
trial changes in behavior; to our knowledge, a similar ﬁnding has only
been reported in one study previously (Arbel et al., 2013). Finally, the
amount of feedback information scaled with the amplitude of a late
posterior slow wave. Notably, whereas the reward positivity dis-
tinguished between binary correct and error feedback, the posterior
slow wave did not; the slow wave only discriminated between correct
and error feedback for conditions that conveyed additional information.
In line with a wider literature about late posterior slow wave activity
across a range of task paradigms, we suggest that this activity may
reﬂect longer-term encoding of the feedback information. Taken to-
gether, these observations are broadly consistent with our suggestion
that the reward positivity reﬂects a motivational system that uses re-
ward signals according to principles of reinforcement learning (Holroyd
and Umemoto, 2016), whereas the later ERP components reﬂect the
application of that information according to supervised learning prin-
ciples.
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